Central environmental protection inspection and carbon emission reduction: A tripartite evolutionary game model from the perspective of carbon neutrality
), Abstract
Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed, many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably. This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the impact of the central environmental protection inspection (CEPI) on driving carbon emission reduction, and to study what factors influence the strategic choices of each party and how they interact with each other. The research results suggest that local governments and manufacturing enterprises would choose strategies that are beneficial to carbon reduction when CEPI increases. When the initial willingness of all parties increases 20%, 50%–80%, the time spent for the whole system to achieve stability decreases from 100%, 60%–30%. The evolutionary result of “thorough inspection, regulation implementation, low-carbon management” is the best strategy for the tripartite evolutionary game. Moreover, the smaller the cost and the larger the benefit, the greater the likelihood of the three-party game stability strategy appears. This study has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote carbon emission reduction by environmental policy.
Keywords
References
Bai, Y., Hua, C., Jiao, J., et al., 2018. Green efficiency and environmental subsidy: evidence from thermal power firms in China. J. Clean. Prod. 188, 49-61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.03.312.
Cai, G., Kock, N., 2009. An evolutionary game theoretic perspective on e-collaboration: the collaboration effort and media relativeness. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 194 (3), 821-833. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2008.01.021.
Chu, Z., Bian, C., Yang, J., 2021. Joint prevention and control mechanism for air pollution regulations in China: a policy simulation approach with evolutionary game. Environ. Impact Assess. Rev. 91, 106668. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.EIAR.2021.106668.
Estalaki, S.M., Abed-Elmdoust, A., Kerachian, R., 2015. Developing environmental penalty functions for river water quality management: application of evolutionary game theory. Environ. Earth Sci. 73, 4201-4213. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12665-014-3706-7.
Fan, W., Wang, S., Gu, X., et al., 2021. Evolutionary game analysis on industrial pollution control of local government in China. J. Environ. Manag. 298, 113499. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2021.113499.
Gao, X., Shen, J., He, W., et al., 2019. An evolutionary game analysis of governments' decision-making behaviors and factors influencing watershed ecological compensation in China. J. Environ. Manag. 251, 109592. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.109592.
Guilhot, L., 2022. An analysis of China's energy policy from 1981 to 2020: transitioning towards to a diversified and low-carbon energy system. Energy Pol. 162, 112806. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2022.112806.
Jiang, B., Sun, Z., Liu, M., 2010. China's energy development strategy under the low-carbon economy. Energy 35 (11), 4257-4264. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2009.12.040.
Jiang, D., Chen, Z., McNeil, L., et al., 2020. The game mechanism of stakeholders in comprehensive marine environmental governance. Mar. Pol. 112, 103728. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103728.
Jiang, K., You, D., Merrill, R., et al., 2019. Implementation of a multi-agent environmental regulation strategy under Chinese fiscal decentralization: an evolutionary game theoretical approach. J. Clean. Prod. 214, 902-915. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.12.252.
Jiang, X., Wang, Q., Li, R., 2018. Investigating factors affecting carbon emission in China and the USA: a perspective of stratified heterogeneity. J. Clean. Prod. 199, 85-92. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.07.160.
Ji, P., Ma, X., Li, G., 2015. Developing green purchasing relationships for the manufacturing industry: an evolutionary game theory perspective. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 166, 155-162. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2014.10.009.
Li, B., Wu, S., 2017. Effects of local and civil environmental regulation on green total factor productivity in China: a spatial Durbin econometric analysis. J. Clean. Prod. 153, 342-353. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.10.042.
Li, R., Zhou, Y., Bi, J., et al., 2020. Does the central environmental inspection actually work? J. Environ. Manag. 253, 109602. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.109602.
Li, X., Yang, X., Wei, Q., et al., 2019. Authoritarian environmentalism and environmental policy implementation in China. Resour. Conserv. Recycl. 145, 86-93. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resconrec.2019.02.011.
Liu, D., Xiao, X., Li, H., et al., 2015. Historical evolution and benefit–cost explanation of periodical fluctuation in coal mine safety supervision: an evolutionary game analysis framework. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 243 (3), 974-984. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2014.12.046.
Ma, Y.R., Ji, Q., Fan, Y., 2016. Spatial linkage analysis of the impact of regional economic activities on PM2.5 pollution in China. J. Clean. Prod. 139, 1157-1167. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.08.152.
Newton, J., 2018. Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance. Games 9 (2), 31.
Park, H.J., Traulsen, A., 2017. Extinction dynamics from metastable coexistences in an evolutionary game. Phys. Rev. 96 (4), 042412. https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.96.042412.
Qiao, W., Dong, P., Ju, Y., 2022. Research on synergistic development mechanism of green building market under government guidance: a case study of Tianjin, China. J. Clean. Prod., 130540 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.130540.
Sartakhti, J.S., Manshaei, M.H., Sadeghi, M., 2017. MMP–TIMP interactions in cancer invasion: an evolutionary game-theoretical framework. J. Theor. Biol. 412, 17-26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.09.019.
Sun, X., Wang, W., Pang, J., et al., 2021. Study on the evolutionary game of central government and local governments under central environmental supervision system. J. Clean. Prod. 296, 126574. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.126574.
Wang, H., Fan, C., Chen, S., 2021a. The impact of campaign-style enforcement on corporate environmental Action: evidence from China's central environmental protection inspection. J. Clean. Prod. 290, 125881. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.125881.
Wang, W., Sun, X., Zhang, M., 2021b. Does the central environmental inspection effectively improve air pollution-An empirical study of 290 prefecture-level cities in China. J. Environ. Manag. 286, 112274. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2021.112274.
Wu, J., Li, B., 2022. Spatio-temporal evolutionary characteristics of carbon emissions and carbon sinks of marine industry in China and their time-dependent models. Mar. Pol. 135, 104879. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104879.
Xiang, C., van Gevelt, T., 2020. Central inspection teams and the enforcement of environmental regulations in China. Environ. Sci. Pol. 112, 431-439. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2020.06.018.
Yang, H., Li, X., Ma, L., et al., 2021. Using system dynamics to analyse key factors influencing China's energy-related CO2 emissions and emission reduction scenarios. J. Clean. Prod. 320, 128811. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.128811.
Yang, Y., Yang, W., Chen, H., et al., 2020. China's energy whistleblowing and energy supervision policy: an evolutionary game perspective. Energy 213, 118774. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.118774.
Young, O.R., Guttman, D., Qi, Y., et al., 2015. Institutionalized governance processes: comparing environmental problem solving in China and the United States. Global Environ. Change 31, 163-173. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.01.010.
Yu, X., 2010. An overview of legislative and institutional approaches to China's energy development. Energy Pol. 38 (5), 2161-2167. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.06.004.
Zhang, G., Zhang, Z., Cui, Y., et al., 2016. Game model of enterprises and government based on the tax preference policy for energy conservation and emission reduction. Filomat 30 (15), 3963-3974. https://doi.org/10.2298/FIL1615963Z.
Zhang, K., Zhang, Z.Y., Liang, Q.M., 2017. An empirical analysis of the green paradox in China: from the perspective of fiscal decentralization. Energy Pol. 103, 203-211. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.01.023.
Zhang, M., Li, H., Song, Y., et al., 2019. Study on the heterogeneous government synergistic governance game of haze in China. J. Environ. Manag. 248, 109318. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.109318.
Zhang, Z., Shang, Y., Zhang, G., et al., 2023a. The pollution control effect of the atmospheric environmental policy in autumn and winter: evidence from the daily data of Chinese cities. J. Environ. Manag. 343, 118164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2023.118164.
Zhang, Z., Wang, J., Feng, C., et al., 2023b. Do pilot zones for green finance reform and innovation promote energy savings? Evidence from China. Energy Econ. 124, 106763. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2023.106763.
Zhang, Z., Zhang, G., Li, L., 2022a. The spatial impact of atmospheric environmental policy on public health based on the mediation effect of air pollution in China. Environ. Sci. Pollut. Control Ser. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-022-21501-6.
Zhang, Z., Zhang, G., Hu, Y., et al., 2023c. The evolutionary mechanism of haze collaborative governance: novel evidence from a tripartite evolutionary game model and a case study in China. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 10 (1), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-01555-8.
Zhang, Z., Zhang, G., Su, B., 2022b. The spatial impacts of air pollution and socio-economic status on public health: empirical evidence from China. Soc. Econ. Plann. Sci. 83, 101167. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.seps.2021.101167.
Zhao, H., Percival, R., 2017. Comparative environmental federalism: subsidiarity and central regulation in the United States and China. Transnational Environmental Law 6 (3), 531-549. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2047102517000206.
Zhao, R., Neighbour, G., Han, J., et al., 2012. Using game theory to describe strategy selection for environmental risk and carbon emissions reduction in the green supply chain. J. Loss Prev. Process. Ind. 25 (6), 927-936. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2012.05.004.
Zhao, R., Zhou, X., Han, J., et al., 2016. For the sustainable performance of the carbon reduction labeling policies under an evolutionary game simulation. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 112, 262-274. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.03.008.
Zhao, X., Li, H., Wu, L., et al., 2014. Implementation of energy-saving policies in China: how local governments assisted industrial enterprises in achieving energy-saving targets. Energy Pol. 66, 170-184. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.10.063.
Zhao, X., Meng, X., Zhou, Y., et al., 2020. Policy inducement effect in energy efficiency: an empirical analysis of China. Energy 211, 118726. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.118726.
京公网安备11010802044758号