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Open Access

Key Recovery Against 3DES in CPU Smart Card Based on Improved Correlation Power Analysis

Yanting Ren, Liji Wu( ), Hexin Li, Xiangyu Li, Xiangmin Zhang, An Wang, Hongyi Chen
Tsinghua National Laboratory for Information Science, Technology （TNList） and the Institute of Microelectronics, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China.
China Information Technology Security Evaluation Center （CNITSEC）, Beijing 100085, China.
School of Computer Science & Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China.
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Abstract

The security of CPU smart cards, which are widely used throughout China, is currently being threatened by side-channel analysis. Typical countermeasures to side-channel analysis involve adding noise and filtering the power consumption signal. In this paper, we integrate appropriate preprocessing methods with an improved attack strategy to generate a key recovery solution to the shortcomings of these countermeasures. Our proposed attack strategy improves the attack result by combining information leaked from two adjacent clock cycles. Using our laboratory-based power analysis system, we verified the proposed key recovery solution by performing a successful correlation power analysis on a Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) hardware module in a real-life 32-bit CPU smart card. All 112 key bits of the 3DES were recovered with about 80 000 power traces.

Keywords

Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES)CPU smart cardspower analysiskey recoveryside-channel analysis

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Tsinghua Science and Technology
Volume 21 Issue 2,
April 2016
Pages 210-220
DOI: 10.1109/TST.2016.7442503
Cite this article:
Ren Y, Wu L, Li H, et al. Key Recovery Against 3DES in CPU Smart Card Based on Improved Correlation Power Analysis. Tsinghua Science and Technology, 2016, 21(2): 210-220. https://doi.org/10.1109/TST.2016.7442503

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Received: 09 April 2015
Revised: 26 October 2015
Accepted: 27 November 2015
Published: 31 March 2016
© The author(s) 2016
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